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ROBIN PAUL MALLOY

There is much debate among economists and other social scientists
about the merits of the "Chicago School" approach to explaining and assessing the operation of legal regimes and other social institutions. In these
debates the Chicago School label is rather indiscriminately applied to a
quite diverse group of scholars. There is some justification for the use of this
term; the persons so described do generally share certain characteristics.
They all apply basic microeconomic principles in a relatively rigorous fashion in their analyses of legal questions, and they use much the same basic
descriptive categories, behavioral assumptions, and core normative premises. However, within these general contours of agreement there is still significant diversity of outlook and approach. Moreover, few if any Chicago
School scholars resemble in any way the pejorative popular caricature of the
zealot analyst who uncritically applies basic price theory to describe and
evaluate real-world situations without regard to unique local conditions and
complexities and without regard to normative principles other than
efficiency.
Law and Economics: New and CriticalPerspectives, a collection edited by
Robin Paul Malloy and Christopher Braun, presents a baker's dozen short

Gregory S. Crespi is an associate professor of law, Southern Methodist University
School of Law.
© 1997 American Bar Foundation.

0897-6546/97/2201-149$01.00

150

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

articles covering a wide range of topics.1 There is no single organizing principle that links all the essays included in the volume. Most of them, however, share a common theme of criticism of the Chicago School. The
authors each suggest modifications of the Chicago School approach that
they argue would make the application of economic principles to legal questions more realistic and more helpful for decision making.
In order to evaluate the merits of these critiques, it will be helpful to
begin with a broad outline of the Chicago School approach. I will, of
course, have to abstract from much of its complexity and sophistication. It is
possible, however, to succinctly convey its core premises, and to make clear
its more significant policy implications.
The Chicago School appellation better represents a mood, a disposition, an analytical style than commitment to a dogma. The style is to begin
with abstract price-theoretic models based on rational actor behavioral assumptions as first approximations to actual situations, and to reluctantly
depart from those limiting assumptions only when the nature of the problem
so dictates, and only to the extent required. The disposition is to assess the
consequences of policies on the basis of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion-the aggregated willingness to pay exhibited by the persons affected by
the policies, given those persons' current resource entitlements--and to
maintain one's allegiance to this normative criterion even when grudgingly
accepting the legitimacy of other normative standards under appropriate
circumstances.
The Chicago School approach rests on the central premise that all
economic actors, whether individuals or other legal entities, can be regarded
as if they are engaging in rational maximization of their utility,3 each acting
on the basis of a relatively stable, exogenously determined, internally consistent set of preferences, under the resource and informational constraints
that they each face in trying to achieve their objectives. From this crucial
starting point the sometimes quite elaborate analyses build in logical
fashion.
If, for example, these rational actors are permitted to compete for advantage in market contexts where their property and contractual rights are
enforced by the state, and if those markets are characterized by free entry
and exit of competitors, sufficiently low information costs and other transaction costs, and internalization of all effects through price signals, then all
1. The essays in the book-titled "Chapters"--are listed in the References. The order
that they appear is Robin Paul Malloy, Paul H. Brietzke, Nicholas Mercuro and Steven
Medema, Perti Ahonen, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Ellen Frankel Paul, Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Jeff L. Lewin, Daniel H. Cole, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Thomas S. Ulen,
and Christopher Kent Braun.
2. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is often referred to as the "wealth-maximization" criterion
or as the "potential Pareto-improvement" criterion. For a further discussion of the properties
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see generally Crespi 1991.
3. Or if the actors are entities rather than individuals, their "profits," broadly defined.
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market transactions whose marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs for
all the actors involved will necessarily take place. Resources will flow to
their highest valued uses through such markets regardless of which actors
initially own the entitlements to their use, if there are no significant impediments blocking such market transactions (the principal postulate of the
famous Coase Theorem). What will ultimately result from all of this rational, informed competition is an equilibrium that appears to have been
arranged by a benevolent "invisible hand"; one that maximizes overall
wealth, as measured by the willingness to pay of the affected persons, relative to any other possible form of social organization of their activity.
Within this framework of restrictive behavioral assumptions, it can be
demonstrated that the economic role of government most conducive to social wealth maximization is a limited one. The state should provide the
security of property and contractual rights preconditions for such market
behavior, and correct as unobtrusively as possible for the various forms of
market failure that may result when one or more of the other requisites for
effective market operation are not met, such as the widespread and low-cost
availability of relevant information, the existence of open competition, the
internalization of all costs and benefits, etc. To the extent that the government can intervene in social contexts to shape them more in the image of
competitive markets, and do so at an acceptably low cost, it will increase
aggregate social wealth. Any other form of intervention that hinders market
processes will likely impede some mutually beneficial transactions, retarding
wealth creation.
This model of human behavior, even if accurate, is incomplete as a
source of policy guidance without some normative premises by which to
evaluate its predicted consequences. Even if "perfect" markets do serve to
maximize aggregate social wealth, this has no necessary relevance for public
policy purposes unless such wealth maximization is regarded as a good thing.
The other core premise of the Chicago School approach is the normative
assertion that such wealth maximization should be the predominant objective of social policy. The consequences of policies are therefore assessed by
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion, which evaluates policies in terms of
their impact on aggregate wealth as measured by the willingness to pay of
those persons affected, without regard to the distribution of those benefits
and costs across the population.
A Chicago School analysis, if it is done without significant departures
from these central behavioral and normative assumptions, thus almost inevitably leads to recommendations that accept as foundational the existing
distribution of wealth and income, and calls for utilization of actual or simulated market mechanisms rather than authoritarian directives to be used as
social coordination mechanisms. This orientation-or bias, if one chooses
to so label it-to favor reliance on the invisible hand of market equilibra-
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tion to coordinate behavior is the main focal point for both criticisms and
defenses of the Chicago School approach.
With these preliminary comments in mind, let me now turn to consideration of the merits of Law and Economics. The collection seeks to gather
in one convenient place relatively nontechnical summaries of some of the
more promising recent scholarship carried out at the junction of economic
analysis and legal theory. While the book thereby will be of interest to other
scholars working in closely related areas, it also will serve well as *a supplementary reading for graduate or advanced undergraduate students studying
4
law, economics, or another related discipline.
Most of the authors contributing to Law and Economics take issue with
some aspect of the basic Chicago School framework described above. They
generally call for modifications of the Chicago School approach to incorporate a greater degree of "realism" into its premises, and argue that such refinements would contribute to a more accurate and discerning assessment of
when market outcomes are likely to be in accord with fundamental social
goals. Stated in sufficiently general terms, such claims are uncontroversial.
Few if any Chicago School members would disagree with the proposition
that, on occasion, analytical models based on more realistic assumptions
will provide better policy guidance. However, many Chicagoans would
probably disagree with most of the Law and Economics authors whether
those authors' proposed analytical departures are likely to lead to more helpful analyses and more discerning normative assessments.
While Law and Economics is a valuable contribution to the interdisciplinary literature, the book is not without its shortcomings. It is difficult to
mesh harmoniously in a single work the contributions of a disparate group
of scholars, each having their own particular research interests, approach,
and style of exposition. Works of this genre consequently often suffer from
the weaknesses of uneven quality, gaps in coverage, and redundancy. Law
and Economics unfortunately fares no better than most such efforts in these
regards. 5 However, the work as a whole successfully presents and critiques
4. While it is necessary to have some prior exposure to microeconomic theory and legal
analysis to benefit fully from the essays, they are accessible not only to law and economics
specialists but also to a broad, nonspecialist readership. In general, the contributions make
only modest use of mathematical or graphical demonstrations.
Coherent collections of related, nontechnical topical essays such as this book are valuable resources for promoting greater understanding of current controversies among disciplinary
specialists. They are particularly helpful as supplementary readings for graduate students working their way toward the current frontiers of inquiry through a primarily technique-oriented
course of study. There are too few such integrated collections of accessible readings focusing
on the fundamental methodological issues that arise at the interdisciplinary junction of law
and economic theory, and Law and Economics helps to fill this gap.
5. The opening and closing articles in the book-contributed by the editors themselves-are unfortunately jargon-laden essays of questionable merit. For example, consider
this impenetrable prose from Christopher Braun (1995:446) with which he closes his essay:
The price market mechanism is simply based upon the semiotic proposition of the triadic
affiliation of understanding and it is ultimately that triad which underlies any under-
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the core principles of Chicago School analysis in a manner that nicely illuminates its contested contours. Moreover, several of the articles were contributed by scholars who have genuinely new insights to share; these
contributions are well-written and provocative in their implications.
Three articles in particular-those of Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Jeffrey
Harrison, and Thomas Ulen-each provide excellent summaries of sustained thinking by their authors regarding significant departures from Chicago School assumptions and are worthy of further discussion in this review
essay. These three articles focus on aspects of the rational actor behavioral
premises of the approach, with Dau-Schmidt subjecting the assumption of
exogenous preferences to broad criticism, Harrison calling for recognition of
an endogenously generated sense of entitlement, and Ulen questioning the
standing of the economic transactions existing in the world around us. As any economic
transaction achieves an extant utility, it can also be said that this utility exists solely as
the constructed dynamism of the powers of interpretants in relation to observed signified
objects.
The opening piece by Robin Paul Malloy (1995:1, 3-4) also tends to obscurity and overstatement, as the following quote suggests:
Throughout this article, therefore, I will refer to the new law and economics and will
mean thereby to refer to my own approach.... The new law and economics allows us to
deconstruct and reconstruct legal argument in a meaningful way by examining the underlying stories and symbols used to support alternative and competing claims to scarce
resources.... [The discourse of the new law and economics is admittedly subjective. It is
contingent and contextual and value laden.... From this starting point the new law and
economics studies discourse as a market sign; as a temporary and contingent equilibrium
of understanding.
Malloy also characterizes the views of Richard Posner in a misleading and mean-spirited fashion which is inappropriate in light of the vast disparity between the extent and significance of
the two authors' influence on the field:
Judge Richard Posner has advocated the acceptability of slavery in modem times; has
declared that the poor and feeble minded have no claims to any of society's scarce resources; has treated the presence of Blacks and Jews in a neighborhood as a common
nuisance; has asserted that morality is a useless form of conversation and that the Nazi
experiments of the Second World War should not be thought of as immoral; and... that
matters of rape can best be understood in the context of determining the costs and benefits of sex when willing partners are difficult to find or simply unavailable. (P. 22)
The collection is also tainted by the inclusion of a rather opaque piece by Pertti Ahonen
(1995) that was apparently intended to communicate some deep insights concerning Finnish
university governance. In all fairness to the author, the piece probably reads much better in
the original Finnish version. Many of the other pieces included in the collection, while competently presented and of some value to those readers relatively new to the field, are rather
pedestrian in their critiques and recommendations.
The collection also suffers from some redundancy. In almost every paper the author takes
pains to first outline the general contours of the conventional Chicago School price-theoretic
approach to applying economic principles to legal questions that they intend to criticize.
While one cannot fault the individual authors for each wanting to properly set the stage for
their critiques and proposals, there was apparently insufficient overall editorial control exercised over the early drafting efforts. The result is that the reader is repeatedly subjected to
virtually the same summary overview of the Chicago School approach. The standard
microeconomic rational actor model with its assumptions about exogenous preferences and
informed, utility maximizing choice behavior, the dynamics of free-market equilibration, the
basic insights of the Coase Theorem, and the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria are
explained in simple terms again and again. The redundancy across the articles in this regard
can be frustrating if one tries to read more than one or two of them in a single sitting.
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assumption of rational behavior. In the remainder of this essay I focus exclusively on these three articles and then close with some general thoughts on
the merits of proposals of this nature to modify the Chicago School
approach.
Before discussing these articles, let me first be candid about my generally skeptical reaction to proposals that call for significantly broadening the
Chicago School framework to make it more "realistic." The potential benefits of such proposals are obvious. The introduction of more realistic and
elaborate premises into an analytical framework potentially allow that
framework to be applied in a more sensitive and nuanced manner that takes
into account contextual factors. Nonetheless, my concern is that when one
makes one's model more realistic by introducing more complex premises,
one also thereby increases-sometimes dramatically-the problems involved in applying it. The more degrees of freedom in a model, the more
parameters that have to be estimated, giving more potential sources of error.
Moreover, the number of possible interrelationships that must be precisely
specified grows geometrically with the number of parameters involved. The
conclusions reached as the model is made more complex become less robust-more sensitive to small variations in the initial parameters-and
greater and greater precision in the data inputs is needed to avoid reaching
indeterminate conclusions. The result is often an elegant and complex but
relatively useless model that cannot produce determinate results unless one
has recourse to an often unavailable comprehensive and precise data set.
This problem of unwieldiness is particularly likely to occur when the
refinements introduced into a model require the measurement of subjective
factors-such as changes in attitudes or limitations on cognitive capabilities-that are inherently difficult to measure and quantify, and to relate to
other, more tangible factors in mathematically precise ways. Even Arthur
Leff (1974), a stalwart foe of Chicago School thinking who wrote the first
powerful critique of Richard Posner's (1974) influential law and economics
treatise, conceded that "tunnel vision is the price we pay for avoiding total
6
blindness."
The great comparative advantage of economists is their refined ability
to expose and debunk "free lunch" fallacies, identifying and revealing the
often substantial hidden costs that accompany the benefits of any action.
Economics is often called the "dismal science" because of this constant emphasis of the inevitability of unpleasant trade-offs. This dismality is unfortunately all-pervasive, in that it extends backwards to questions of
methodology as well as to the subject matter of the field. In other words,
one must confront trade-offs even in how one studies the extent and nature
of trade-offs! This constraint places more severe limitations on scholars
6. Leff 1974:477. Richard Posner himself has noted (1992:17) that "complicationism"
may ultimately be a more harmful scholarly sin than reductionism.

Does the Chicago School Need to Expand Its Curriculum?

than is generally appreciated. Any moves toward incorporating greater realism into one's models must yield substantial returns in predictive accuracy
or normative power to justify the generally high costs of dealing with the
increased data requirements and analytical complexity. Thus, as I assess the
Dau-Schmidt, Harrison, and Ulen essays, my focus is on whether their proposals are justified in light of this constraint.
DAU-SCHMIDT ON ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES
One of the core premises of Chicago School analysis is that people's
preferences are presumed to be exogenous with respect to the legal system.
In other words, those preferences are viewed as innate personal characteristics that have a pre-legal, pre-political, acontextual existence, and are not
affected by the legal rules that determine people's initial entitlements and
govern their conduct. The rankings one assigns to all possible states of the
world are assumed to be independent of what one has or can expect to get
from that world. The predictive and normative analyses done under this
exogenous preference framework focus on the way different legal regimes
each translate into a set of price-like constraints on persons seeking to maximize their satisfaction, given those preferences. The allocative effects of
different legal regimes are projected, and the welfare consequences for each
affected person are calculated on a willingness-to-pay basis for each of the
alternative regimes. The willingness-to-pay benefit and cost impacts of each
regime are then aggregated to give the net benefit (or net cost) impacts of
that regime, and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is then applied to make comparative efficiency assessments of those legal regimes.
The assumption of exogenous preferences is of course a reductionist
and unrealistic premise, given that a number of our more important social
institutions are designed largely to alter preferences, not merely to structure
the pattern of opportunities. Examples that come readily to mind include
such diverse social institutions as families, schools, churches, prisons, and
advertising. These institutions often succeed in inculcating unreflective
habits of behavior that operate largely independent of price signals and in
instilling strong psychological aversions to stigmatized activities. In fact,
one could reasonably argue that the diametrically opposed postmodernist
assumption-that preferences are not innate at all but are merely socially
constructed artifacts imposed upon the blank slates of our minds-would be
a more accurate first approximation to reality.
In his essay Kenneth Dau-Schmidt argues that the Chicago School approach would have greater descriptive and predictive power, and its conclusions would have more normative force, if its premises were modified to
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reflect the fact that preferences are in fact often endogenous.7 He argues that
a number of significant bodies of law are intended not merely to facilitate
the efficient personal fulfillment of preferences by properly pricing conduct
so as to eliminate externalities and other market-distorting factors but also
to influence those preferences so as to make persons more inclined to engage in socially desirable conduct. As examples he cites some safety and
environmental regulations, antidiscrimination laws, punitive civil remedies,
and numerous aspects of the criminal law (p. 154). His point is dramatic:
Given the pervasiveness and significance of laws which attempt to-and
often do-alter preferences, isn't it unwise to predict and assess their consequences using an analytical framework that assumes away this very
possibility?
My first impulse was to agree wholeheartedly. But then I did the dismal
thing and considered the trade-offs involved. Dau-Schmidt's burden is to
show that the benefits of greater realism are not outweighed by expanded
data requirements, added analytical difficulties, or normative assessment
complications. On reflection, I am not convinced that he has met that
burden.
Economists have generally embraced the exogenous preference assumption and ignored preference-shaping objectives and effects in their analyses.
As Dau-Schmidt recognizes (pp. 155-56), this is not because they are unaware that the assumption of exogenous preferences is unrealistic but is primarily because of the tractability concerns noted above. It is much more
difficult to formulate a model for predicting the effects of implementing a
policy if that model must not only be able to specify the constraints imposed
by that policy but must also include a "preference function" that will specify
with the necessary mathematical precision the nature and extent of the
changes in preferences that will result.
It would be quite a chore to obtain data adequate to establish the parameters of such a preference function, given that the observed responses of
persons to any policy will be an intertwined mixture of changes in their
preferences and responses to the changed opportunity set. The econometric
work necessary to quantitatively separate these sources of response from one
another would be a major undertaking. Moreover, the relative significance
of preference changes versus opportunity set changes for explaining the consequences of a policy would vary significantly across different kinds of poli7. With regard to laws, wrote Dau-Schmidt (1995:153-54), that "are also intended to
influence the underlying preferences... the traditional economic analysis of law will not give
an adequate positive or normative description of the phenomenon ...the analysis of these
laws as preference-shaping policies provides a superior positive and normative description."
Dau-Schmidt's contribution is an edited and generalized version of an earlier, longer
article focusing primarily on criminal law questions (Dau-Schmidt 1990). That earlier work
was in turn based heavily on seminal writing on endogenous preferences done by Jon Elster
and Cass Sunstein, among others. See, e.g., Elster (1983); Sunstein (1986).
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cies that would encounter different degrees of resistance from the initial
preference structures." It would therefore be difficult to generalize from past
experience as to the preference-changing impacts of novel policies. It would
require substantial efforts, to say the least, to specify and estimate the parameters of a global preference function that could reasonably accurately
take into account the differential impacts on preferences of laws that are of
widely varying nature and significance to those persons affected.
Dau-Schmidt recognizes these problems, 9 but he does not address, even
in the most general terms, how such a preference function is to be formulated. He focuses instead on convincing the reader that some laws do in fact
alter preferences, as well as shape opportunities, and on the important normative issue raised by the specter of endogenous preferences: When, if ever,
is it appropriate for the state to attempt to alter preferences?
These are important questions, to be sure, but the argument omits a
key step. It is premature to consider how to assess the desirability of preference-changing policies until we first have in place some framework for determining the nature and extent of the preference changes that will result
from those policies. If we cannot even predict what changes in preferences
will result if we implement a policy, then we are not yet at the point where
we need to hammer out normative standards by which we can aggregate and
assess its preference-altering consequences. Dau-Schmidt's argument for
modifying the Chicago School assumption of exogenous preferences is unconvincing without a demonstration that estimation of a preference function is feasible.
Moreover, even if a preference function can in fact be formulated, the
problems for normative assessment are even more severe than those that
would arise in the descriptive/predictive context. If one's model assumes
that legal changes do not have an impact on preferences, the Kaldor-Hicks
willingness to pay criterion applied by Chicago School analysts has significant appeal as a normative standard. First of all, unlike more paternalistic
measures of social welfare, it respects the widely embraced value of individual autonomy. It does so, moreover, without going to the paralyzing extreme
of requiring unanimity as does the Pareto-improvement criterion. Each person's own assessment of the benefits or costs of a policy is used in the
calculus, to the extent it is supported by financial capability. The KaldorHicks criterion also has the advantage of yielding assessments that are congruent with the widely shared intuition that aggregate wealth increases are
8. Laws that change what values are taught in elementary schools, for example, might
have relatively more impact on preferences and less on opportunity sets than, for example,
changes in the level of import duties on textiles.
9. Dau-Schmidt (p. 172) writes: "[]f one wants to examine the possibility that a policy
also affects preferences, one must contend with the problem that any observed influence of
the policy might be due to changes in opportunities, preferences, or both. Such simultaneity
problems are of course challenging for empirical work."
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usually socially beneficial. The criterion is, of course, still subject to strong
criticism because of the status quo bias inherent in its "one-dollar, onevote" referenda, its lack of any concept of "rights," the conceptual problems
involved in determining whether to use offer or asking prices for valuation
purposes, and certain other, more technical difficulties.' 0
Once one expands the model to include the possibility of preference
changes resulting from legal rules, and takes those preference changes into
account in any overall normative assessment, the justification for use of the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion weakens considerably. To apply the criterion one
must first choose whether to measure the willingness-to-pay consequences
of a policy on the basis of the affected persons' pre-policy or post-policy
preferences. It seems more reasonable to use the post-policy preferences as
the valuation baseline, since use of the pre-policy preferences would largely
defeat the purpose of allowing for endogenous preferences in the first place.
However, it is uncomfortably close to circular reasoning to justify a policy
on the basis of its willingness-to-pay consequences if the preferences that
generate that expressed willingness to pay are themselves at least partly the
creations of that policy. While it is possible that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
so applied would lead to reasonable results under some circumstances, 1 it is
easy to imagine other circumstances under which that criterion would endorse outrageous policies that almost no one would approve of in advance of
their implementation. 12 The abandonment of the exogenous preferences assumption thus creates complications that would probably require the abandonment of the simple Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion and the
development of a new standard for normative assessment that was more
discerning with regard to the merits of preference changes.
Dau-Schmidt candidly recognizes that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is
poorly suited to serve as a normative standard in an endogenous preferences

10. The literature criticizing the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is voluminous. For one relatively
comprehensive critique, see generally Kennedy 1981. See also Calabresi 1991; Crespi
1991:234-37.
11. For example, consider an environmental law requiring polluters to make greater expenditures to avoid emitting airborne pollutants. Such a measure might fail to be a KaldorHicks improvement under the conventional exogenous preferences framework, given the initial preference structure. One of its effects, however, might be to shape preferences so that the
public becomes more concerned with clean air and polluters feel more moral opprobrium.
Under the endogenous preference framework, a Kaldor-Hicks calculation made on the basis of
the new, more pro-environmental preference structure might indicate the law to be an improvement. The latter normative judgment as to the desirability of the law seems at least as
reasonably reached as the former, perhaps even more so.
12. As an extreme example, consider a group of persons who each object strenuously to
being lobotomized but who after forced lobotomy each express a high degree of satisfaction
with their new condition. How many persons would accept as meaningful an endorsement of
this measure based on a positive postlobotomy preferences-based Kaldor-Hicks assessment of
its consequences?
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model, and accepts the necessity of using another criterion. 13 While in his
short essay he does not develop a normative criterion suitable for an endogenous preferences model, he does offer some indications as to what properties he would wish such a standard to encompass.
Dau-Schmidt asserts that the costs of preference-shaping policies will
generally be higher than the costs of policies that merely alter opportunities,
primarily because of other costs he claims are associated with intrusions
upon individual autonomy (pp. 156-57). He therefore argues that the state
should "reserve preference-shaping policies for cases where the costs of preference shaping are unusually low or the benefits of preference shaping are
unusually large" (p. 157). This statement is an implicit endorsement of the
cautious use of some sort of aggregative social welfare criterion that nets out
costs and benefits-in that way somewhat akin to the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion.
However, Dau-Schmidt clearly has some reservations concerning the
use of an aggregative normative standard, and seriously engages the quasilibertarian position that people have a fundamental right to not be subjected to governmental attempts to shape their preferences. While he ultimately rejects that position,14 he is obviously concerned by the potential for
tyranny inherent in governmental efforts to shape the desires of its citizens.
He notes the limitations that democratic political institutions and constitutional Bill of Rights protections place on the use of such measures (p. 169),
and concludes that given those limitations, an absolute ban on governmental attempts to shape preferences is unwarranted (pp. 168-70). However, he
also seeks to develop some additional normative principles of a more "economic" character that might further limit the potential for abusive intrusions on personal autonomy.
Having grudgingly endorsed the concept of a net social benefit measure but having rejected the Kaldor-Hicks willingness-to-pay approach to
valuing social benefits and costs as inappropriate in the endogenous preference context, Dau-Schmidt is forced to come up with some other reasonable method of quantifying benefits and costs that shows proper regard for
autonomy concerns. At this point the going gets a little tough. The approach he takes is to distinguish between preferences on the basis of how
13. He writes (p. 172 n. 9): "[Blecause wealth is a concept that depends on the current
distribution of preferences and I want to discuss the possibility of legal policies that seek to
change that distribution of preferences, I am forced to undertake my analysis in terms of the
more subjective philosophical construct 'social welfare."' He further notes (pp. 172-73 n. 14):
"If one wants to evaluate the possible benefits of changes in individual preferences, one has to
adopt the more subjective criterion of social welfare maximization."
14. He writes (p. 168): "To some economists, the notion that society might.., actively
seek to promote those favored preferences... is an anathema, destined to lead to tyranny.
They argue... that society must confine itself to merely opportunity-shaping methods of
controlling individual behavior.... I would argue that it is not... necessary for a society to
totally abstain from the use of preference shaping in order to avoid a rein of tyranny."
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much "society" values their realization, as indicated by the "social welfare
function" (p. 158), and then assign values to preference changes that are
weighted accordingly. Changes in preferences that are in accord with what
society highly values are thus to be given significant weight as benefits,
whereas the fact that some people do not want their preferences to be
changed will be given little weight as a cost item if those prior preferences
are not highly valued by society (p. 158), particularly if those preferences
are "invidious preferences" such as the desire to interfere with other persons'
freedom (p. 163), or if they arise from a "distortion... of self-realization
caused by the existing social structure" (p. 169).
Preference-changing policies stemming from widespread "self-paternalism"-seat belt and recycling laws, for example-are to have their impacts
highly valued (pp. 161, 169), whereas policies that merely reflect the desire
of one group to impose their preferences on another group-motorcycle
helmet laws are an example he gives-are to have their benefits more
highly discounted (p. 161). The costs of preference-shaping policies will be
regarded as low if the preferences to be shaped "are ones that are not
strongly identified with self-realization or self-definition" (p. 157) or if the
preferences are "sufficiently deviant" (p. 165).
Dau-Schmidt does not address how the benefits and costs of the preference alterations that result from a policy, once estimated through application of the social welfare function, are to be aggregated with the impacts of
the changed opportunity set resulting from that policy in order to reach an
overall normative assessment. Presumably, once the preference-altering effects of the policy have been calculated, the costs and benefits of the opportunity set impacts are then to be calculated in a conventional Kaldor-Hicks
fashion, on the basis of the post-policy preference structures, and then the
two sets of effects are to be aggregated into a single bottom-line figure.
It is clear that the normative policy assessment that Dau-Schmidt envisions under his proposed framework will be a rather subjective exercise.
The assessment of the value of preference changes would seem to depend
almost entirely on what "social welfare function" the analyst uses to determine whether particular changes are to be regarded as costs or benefits and
to assign numerical values to these changes. Since there is nothing even
remotely approaching consensus concerning the specifications of the social
welfare function, that degree of freedom would render highly subjective and
controversial any normative assessment carried out in this fashion.
A significant consequence of relaxing the Chicago School assumption
of exogenous preferences, therefore, is that even if a preference function can
be formulated that is accurate enough to use for predictive purposes, which
seems most unlikely, normative evaluation under an endogenous preferences model will necessarily be reduced essentially to advancing one's own
subjective assessment of the merits of the policy under consideration. Thus
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Dau-Schmidt's proposed technical refinement, which appears at first only
to be a fine-tuning of the conventional approach, would actually involve a
more radical return to the more subjective and moralistic political economy
approach to policy evaluation that was once in fashion, prior to the development of modem microeconomic theory and the Chicago School
framework.
The problems with the political economy approach, of course, were
that it lacked rigor in its descriptions and predictions and provided no
means to command assent to one's normative conclusions from persons who
did not agree with the many value judgments one had made along the way.
This lack of rigor and authoritativeness was exactly the problem that the
scholars who developed the Chicago School approach were trying to finesse
with their more narrow, reductionist approach and with their more "objective" willingness-to-pay-based normative criterion. Dau-Schmidt is therefore taking a major step by suggesting that the exogenous preference
assumption be relaxed. His essay is very thought-provoking, but raises more
questions than it answers. To the extent that his objective is to convince
the reader that this refinement will expand the power and usefulness of
Chicago School analysis, he is unconvincing. The changes in the approach
that refinement would necessitate would be so far-reaching that they would
alter its character entirely. For better or worse, discarding the exogenous
preferences assumption is tantamount to repudiating the Chicago School
approach entirely and returning to an earlier mode of policy debate.15
HARRISON ON INCORPORATING THE SENSE OF

ENTITLEMENT
16
The short piece contributed to Law and Economics by Jeffrey Harrison
also calls for departure from the Chicago School assumption of exogenous
preferences. However, Harrison's proposal, which calls for incorporating a
sense of entitlement into the framework, is a much more limited extension
of the Chicago School approach than Dau-Schmidt's.
Harrison's argument develops three major points. The first is that people not only have preferences regarding what goods and services they would
like to obtain but also have a "sense of entitlement" that the exchanges that
they enter into as a means of moving to higher levels of satisfaction should
be "fair." Moreover, people will regard themselves as having been treated

15. Such a change has much to be said for it, some of which I have tried to communicate in my earlier writings. See Crespi 1991. But I believe that such a major change, if it is to
be made, should be done so directly and straightforwardly, rather than indirectly and perhaps
inadvertently through tinkering with the Chicago School framework.
16. Harrison's contribution is an abridged version of a much longer article, "Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability," that appeared in 1994 in William and Mary Law
Review.
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fairly only if they obtain at least what they perceive to be their proper share
of the gains from trade. They may even refuse to enter into a seemingly
mutually beneficial transaction if they feel that the division of gains is sufficiently unfair.
Harrison's second point is that a person's sense of what constitutes a
"fair" division of the gains from exchange is not an innate, exogenous preference but is instead endogenously determined by the legal and social order,
with one's social class being a particularly significant determinant of one's
sense of entitlement (p. 222). Persons from higher social classes will generally have a stronger sense of entitlement and, consequently, will insist that
they receive a larger share of the net gains from a transaction.
His final point is that the Chicago School model should be modified to
take into account this endogenous "sense of entitlement." He argues that
such a move toward greater realism would have several important ramifications. First, the resulting framework would be less likely to overstate the
number of otherwise Pareto-efficient transactions that will occur under various legal regimes, since the models would take into account the fact that
some people will choose to forgo seemingly mutually beneficial transactions
because of the perceived unfairness of the associated division of gains. Second, recognizing the operation of this endogenous preference would enable
analysts to better predict how the parties to exchanges will divide the gains
from trade and thus more accurately predict the resource allocation consequences of policies.
The final, and most significant, consequence would be to clarify that
the seemingly uncontroversial Pareto-efficiency criterion is in fact a very
"thin" normative standard that overlooks much of significance (p. 231).
Some Pareto-efficient transactions occur only because one of the parties is
willing to accept a very disadvantageous division of the gains from trade.
These persons do so, Harrison argues, because they have been socialized by
the experience of relative deprivation to have a very weak sense of entitlement. These transactions therefore may lack the moral legitimacy to be
properly enforced by contract law (p. 237). Incorporation of the sense of
entitlement into normative assessment would thus have significant and critical implications for the evaluation of current contract law doctrines that
favor enforcement of "consensual" transactions without regard to whether
they occur between persons of different social classes (pp. 230-31, 237-39).
Does there really exist a class-dependent sense of entitlement? In his
effort to convince, Harrison draws on two separate bodies of theoretical
work that have recently been developed: equity theory and relative deprivation theory. 17 Equity theory rests on the general proposition that people
regard transactions as fair when each person's share of the gains is perceived
to be proportional to what he/she has contributed to the transaction (pp.
17. See Harrison (1995:224-29) and the sources cited therein.
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224-25). Harrison argues that persons of higher social class regard more
aspects of their educational and other background as constituting inputs
they have contributed, thus justifying a relatively larger share of the returns
(ibid.). Relative deprivation theory is based on the idea that when people
judge whether they are being accorded fair treatment, they tend to make
their comparisons with persons of similar social class rather than with a
more generic average (p. 225).
Harrison claims that there is sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate the existence of the sense of entitlement. He then presents a graphical Edgeworth Box model to explain how the sense of entitlement exhibited
by one or both parties to a potential exchange will limit the range of mutually acceptable terms of trade. He also notes that the sense of entitlement
that limits that range could alternatively be regarded not as a preference,
but instead as a party-specific "transaction cost" that could block some
otherwise Pareto-efficient exchanges (p. 237).
In Harrison's view, regardless of what underlying psychological and sociological theories are used to explain the phenomenon of a class-based
sense of entitlement, the implication of that phenomena is that relatively
disadvantaged persons will come to accept conventional divisions of the
gains from trade as fair, as opposed to aspiring to some more favorable allocation (p. 227). Traditional splits tend to become endowed with normative
significance. This phenomenon thus tends to legitimize and sustain existing
patterns of social and economic stratification. By incorporating this phenomenon into our descriptive and normative models, he concludes, we are
therefore less likely to accept uncritically measures that will allow the more
well-off to exploit the less fortunate under the cover of "consensual" market
transactions (pp. 237-39).
This insightful and disturbing essay reveals a significant shortcoming of
the Chicago School approach. People often do adjust their expectations in
some fashion to conform to their lot in life, so as to reduce their sense of
deprivation and discomfort, and the use of analytical models that ignore this
fact may lead to misleading conclusions. A scholar who engages in Chicago
School-style analyses of policy proposals will, after reading this essay, certainly be more aware that his exogenous preference models overlook a significant impediment to certain classes of transactions and ignore a crucial
social factor relevant to determining the division of the gains from trade. He
will also be less likely to uncritically endorse Pareto-efficient transactions
and more inclined to consider the nature and sources of the motivations of
the participants to those transactions.
However, while Harrison's cautions provide important caveats for use
of the model, it is not clear that this endogenous sense of entitlement can
be formally incorporated into the Chicago School framework without creating insuperable analytical difficulties. If it could be done, there would be
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obvious benefits. One could then assess precisely the extent to which the
sense of entitlement is impeding exchange and rigorously take into account
the sense-of-entitlement-altering aspects of policies that cause changes in
the social class structure. To do so, however, one would have to include an
equation that would specify each person's sense of entitlement as a function
of the overall distribution of entitlements. While this would not have to be
the full-blown "preference function" that Dau-Schmidt's proposal of abandoning the exogenous preference assumption would require, it would still
entail a herculean (and probably futile) effort. Harrison himself recognizes
that while the equity and relative deprivation theory arguments have intuitive appeal, they have not yet been developed to the extent which would
allow for precise prediction and analysis (pp. 226-27).
Overall, Harrison has made an excellent point on how the attitudes of
economic actors are shaped by their social position, and he has provocatively drawn out the implications of that insight. His concerns should be
kept in mind by all persons engaged in Chicago School analyses, to avoid
the risk of uncritically endorsing Pareto improvements that conceal lurking
inequities. His insight is not, however, easily amenable to formal incorporation into conventional analytic models. The allowance of an assumption of
endogeneity for even a very limited set of preferences is just too unruly to
harness in rigorous fashion within the Chicago School framework.

ULEN ON RECOGNIZING COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS
Thomas Ulen considers in the tort law context the implications of relaxing another central assumption of Chicago School analysis: the assumption that potential tortfeasors and victims will act in a rational fashion. 18 He
begins by outlining at some length-and in a relatively more technical style
than that adopted by the other contributors to the book-the conventional
Chicago School framework used for the economic analysis of tort law. That
framework is based on a view of tort law as primarily a vehicle for minimizing the total social costs of accidents and accident prevention, through the
creation of incentives that internalize all costs, in a context where consensual pre-accident allocation is not possible (pp. 388-89). Ulen makes clear
that this framework rests on a number of simplifying assumptions. Most significantly, potential torfeasors and victims are assumed to have stable,
transitive preferences, be reasonably well informed, and respond rationally
to any incentives provided (p. 389). The model further assumes that litigation is costless, the courts are infallible, there exists no possibility to shift
liability through insurance, and that no other social policies exist that
18. Ulen's essay is essentially an abridged version of some earlier work he has done
(1989) concerning the significance of cognitive limitations for the economic analysis of law.
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would internalize the costs of accidents (pp. 389-90). Under these severe
simplifying assumptions, various regimes of liability such as negligence,
strict liability, or comparative and contributory negligence, can be assessed
for their relative efficiency through application of the Kaldor-Hicks normative criterion to their effects.
Ulen takes the reader through a relatively complex and sophisticated
review of the main conclusions reached through this conventional Chicago
School assessment, which can be summarized as follows. First, a negligence
standard that defines reasonable behavior as taking all cost-justified precautions will provide the efficient incentives for all potential tortfeasors (pp.
399-400) and for all potential victims (p. 402). Second, a strict liability
standard will, somewhat counterintuitively, provide the same efficient incentives for potential tortfeasors, although it will not induce an efficient
level of precaution by potential victims (p. 404). Therefore, a negligence
standard that uses a definition of reasonableness based on cost-justified precautions will create more efficient incentives than would a strict liability
regime for persons to take due care, except under unusual circumstances
where there is nothing potential victims can do to lessen the possibility or
severity of injury (p. 406). In those latter circumstances the efficiency of
the two standards would be the same.
Ulen next turns to his main concern: the implications of relaxing the
assumption of rational behavior. He begins by defining rationality as meaning that one has transitive preferences. 19 He notes that economists have
been reluctant to abandon the assumption of rationality, partly for the reasons of analytical tractability discussed at length above but also because
most deviations from the predictions of price theory can be explained without having to postulate irrationality (pp. 411-12). However, he is aware
that much recent scholarship by cognitive psychologists and economists has
produced results that are difficult to reconcile with this assumption,20 and
he is apparently concerned about work suggesting that people do not act
rationally when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
Ulen concludes that the evidence supports the argument that many
people do have cognitive limitations that cause them to depart from strict
rationality in several relatively predictable ways. First of all, they have difficulty dealing rationally with low-probability events and do not always price
these events through a rational application of expected-value and risk analysis techniques.2 ' They commonly overvalue moderately low-probability
19. A person is said to have transitive preferences if, when he prefers a bundle of goods
A to a different bundle B, and prefers bundle B to bundle C, then he will necessarily prefer
bundle A to bundle C. Ulen, p. 411.
20. Ulen, pp. 412-13. See also Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990.
21. One of the most interesting findings of recent experimental work on the psychology
of choice under uncertainty is that people will under certain circumstances say that they
would be willing to pay more for the opportunity to take gamble A than to take gamble B,
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events, while undervaluing or ignoring completely very low-probability outcomes. Second, they have difficulty dealing with problems that involve intertemporal choice and at times behave in ways that imply very high
discount rates that are inconsistent with those implicit in some of their
other actions (pp. 416-17). Finally, they often ascribe a higher value to a
good they own than they would to the same good if they did not own it and
had to purchase it (pp. 413-18).
If this sort of seemingly irrational choice behavior is in fact widespread,
what consequences should that have for the economic analysis of tort law?
Clearly, if people are not responding rationally to the incentives created by
the tort law regime, then a regime that presupposes rationality is unlikely to
achieve its desired objectives. In particular, Ulen argues, if potential
tortfeasors or victims must engage in complicated probability calculations to
determine their optimal conduct, they are quite likely to behave in an inefficient fashion. As a result, it may be more efficient to impose a simple,
bright-line rule of liability, even if it is not perfectly tailored to the situation
of each affected person, to obviate the need for such calculations. Ulen also
makes the more subtle point that if there are general differences in the
degree of cognitive capability between potential tortfeasors and potential
victims for various kinds of accidents, this would have a bearing on the
relative efficiency of negligence and strict liability regimes governing those
contexts.
The recognition of significant and widespread cognitive limitations as
a factor to be considered in designing tort laws could have major implications for governmental efforts to regulate risk. A Chicago School analysis
would suggest that if all costs are internalized, all that is necessary to
achieve efficiency is perfect information. However, if people are processing
information in an irrational fashion, this conclusion will not hold. Rather
than attempt to assure dissemination of the information needed to facilitate
accurate risk assessment, it may then be more efficient for governments to
impose clear standards of conduct that are congruent with the behaviors
most persons would choose if they acted rationally.
If, as an example that Ulen gives, motorcyclists systematically underestimate the benefits of wearing helmets, it may be more efficient to mandate
helmet-wearing than to attempt to provide cyclists with better information
about safety risks. Many other examples come easily to mind. If cognitive
limitations are widespread and significant in magnitude, efficiency would
when gamble A has the higher expected value but then, if told to assume that they own those
gambles and are to price them for sale, will seeming reverse themselves and place a higher
price on gamble B than gamble A. Ulen, pp. 413-44. This behavior could be explained as a
case of intransitive preferences or, instead, as an instance where the behavior demonstrated is
not "procedure invariant;" i.e., is affected by the procedure used to measure it (p. 414). Ulen
cites approvingly a recent influential article that concludes that this behavior is best explained by the latter hypothesis (p. 415).
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perhaps be better served by moving to a simpler and more paternalistic set
of tort laws that relied less on rational individual judgment.
Ulen has made a valuable contribution to the literature by grappling
with the implications of the increasingly strong body of evidence that suggests that people often do not behave in rational fashion. He has made clear
that there is increasing reason to be suspicious of the conclusions of Chicago School analyses of tort law efficiency that presuppose universal rationality. He has also demonstrated that allowing for the existence of cognitive
limitations can have considerable implications for the design of efficient
tort rules.
Ulen fully recognizes, however, that the study of cognitive limitations
is in its very early stages. He concedes that considerably more research is
needed to establish who suffers from these limitations, and to what extent
and under what circumstances, before the rationality assumption of the Chicago School framework can be relaxed in a formal manner that would allow
for the making of falsifiable explanations and predictions. He admits that
these are "daunting questions" but concludes that "they must be answered if
the economic analysis of tort law is to advance" (p. 423) Even if one is not
willing to go quite as far as Ulen does in assessing the significance of cognitive limitations research for the future of economic analysis, one must concede that it is an important intellectual frontier that merits further inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Law and Economics nicely illuminates the potentially adverse implications of some of the central restrictive assumptions of the conventional Chicago School approach to the economic analysis of law, and in so doing it
provides a needed balance to the extreme emphasis on the formal, mathematical techniques of Chicago School analysis that currently characterizes
much literature and graduate education in that field. While it is somewhat
uneven in the quality of its contributions, and prone to redundancy across
the articles, it includes several insightful essays, especially those of Kenneth
Dau-Schmidt, Jeffrey Harrison, and Thomas Ulen. However, none of these
three writers succeeds in proposing an adequate replacement for the particular assumption that they call into question. To broaden the premises of the
Chicago School framework to allow for the endogeniety of preferences, a
widespread sense of entitlement, or pervasive cognitive limitations would
likely complicate the resulting analyses to the point where no definitive
conclusions could be reached on any significant issue. This would virtually
be tantamount to discarding the Chicago School framework altogether,
which seems premature given the lack of alternative explanatory models of
comparable scope and power.
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Despite their failure to propose adequate solutions to the analytical
problems of the Chicago School framework that they so clearly identify, the
Dau-Schmidt, Harrison, and Ulen essays nevertheless each provide extremely valuable background and cautionary advice for those persons who
must perform or use the results of such analyses. These provocative articles
alone justify the book's publication and mark it as a valuable contribution
to interdisciplinary scholarship.
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